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Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) footprints in terms of relevant policies, plans 
and programs are evident at a global scale, but the level of national uptake and 
penetration differs, as countries differ considerably in terms of institutional efficiency. 
With this in mind, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between 
CSR penetration and institutional conditions that shape and define the macroeconomic 
environment and development dynamics of countries. Building on Campbell's (2007) 
seminal framework on institutional parameters that facilitate effective CSR 
management, we offer new findings on the national specificity of CSR and additional 
perspectives for future research on the political economy of responsible business 
conduct. 
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Introduction 
Since the 1990s, corporate social responsibility (CSR), as an emerging area of 
study of organizational management has expanded and the umbrella-term of 
responsible business conduct has gained increasing attention at a global scale  under 
the scope of mitigation, stewardship and sustainability concerns (Wood, 2010; Lozano 
2012). Nevertheless, this continuously expanding sub-field of business literature 
pertains mostly to studies focusing at the micro-level within certain national 
environments while there is limited research at the macro-level (i.e. sectoral and 
cross-country assessments). In this respect, critical questions posed to policy-makers 
and scholars respectively are: why firms in some countries are more socially 
responsible than firms in other countries? What are the factors that affect CSR across 
countries? Which institutional parameters facilitate strong CSR penetration in a 
national economy and why the business sector in certain countries and regions 
exhibits comparatively weaker CSR penetration? 
Our paper attempts to respond to such pressing questions and contribute to the 
scant literature of institutionally-bound CSR assessment. The study builds on the 
work of Campbell (2007) who set forth a series of assertions grounded on institutional 
theory on why firms engage in socially responsible behavior. We empirically examine 
such normative arguments referring to macroeconomic stability, competition, 
industrial self-regulation, regulatory quality as well as civic activism and 
operationalize them at the national level. Taking into consideration data availability 
for various institutional conditions as well as the limitations of cross-country CSR 
assessments, this study paves the ground for further in-depth investigation of the 
institutional conditions that define national CSR performance. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 outlines Campbell’s 
theoretical model and propositions. Next, the data and methods are described 
followed by the presentation of results. Finally, the discussion of our findings and 
concluding remarks on opportunities for future research wrap up the paper. 
Background 
The institutional conditions of a country have been pinpointed for their enormous 
influence over organizational decisions or actions. The institutional environment has 
been characterized as the ‘rules of the game’ (Thelen, 1999), defining business actions 
and regarded as essential antecedent of the development potential of nations by 
enabling stability and facilitating market efficiency. Findings by Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002) as well as Harms and Ursprung (2002) indicate a positive relationship 
between foreign direct investment inflows (FDIs) and the institutional conditions of 
countries while a negative relationship of FDIs with the relative level of national 
corruption has also been documented (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). In this respect, 
Barley (2007) criticizes management literature’s lag in attending a broader 
understanding of the interaction between for-profit organizations and their 
multifaceted institutional environment. 
The long debate on corporate responsibility has emphasized on the relation 
between social and financial performance (Cochran and Wood, 1984; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Margolis et al, 2007) in an attempt to signify CSR as a missing link in 
improving the financial bottom line and competitiveness (Kotler and Lee, 2005; 
Porter and Kramer, 2006; Vilanova et al., 2009). Despite viewed as a global issue 
endorsed over the years by international organizations and through transnational best-
practice schemes, CSR penetration has exhibited increased variation across regions 
and countries (Welford 2003; 2005). Such variation pertains to the level as well as the 
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focus of corporate involvement (Marquis et al., 2007) something which is attributed to 
discrepancies in the institutional efficiency among countries. Yet, CSR scholars have 
been somewhat slow to investigate the effects of institutional conditions on 
responsible business conduct (Aguilera et al., 2007; Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). 
It is only during the mid-2000s when the conceptual approaches in exploring the CSR 
construct have expanded to include the institutional lens to better understand 
nonfinancial aspects of corporate responsibility (e.g. Aguilera et al., 2007).  
An increasing body of literature indicates that corporate responsibility is dependent 
on and embedded in a nexus of institutions that characterize the national identity of 
each country (Khanna et al., 2006). Placing CSR within the wider terrain of 
institutional mechanisms allowed the initiation of a more cross-disciplinary inquiry of 
responsible business conduct through different modes pertaining to political economy, 
political science, corporate law, sociology of organizations, cultural traits, religious 
norms and/or regional traditions and the relational pressures that stem from such 
institutional aspects. For instance, research evidence by Baskin (2006) and Jamali et 
al. (2009) echoes supporting arguments on the institutional interplay between state 
policies, private sector discretionary activities and civil society’s activism in shaping 
the CSR penetration among national contexts.  
Scholars are beginning to identify the critical importance of institutions in 
explaining CSR-specific aspects (Jamali and Neville, 2011), such as human resources 
management, environmental performance, nonfinancial accountability or community 
relations (Edelman and Suchman, 1997; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Guthrie and McQuarrie, 
2004; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Hoffman, 2001; Sharma, 2000; Chen and Bouvain, 
2009). Still, cross-country comparisons between CSR and national institutional 
settings are relatively rare (e.g. Jackson ad Apostolakou, 2010), compared to other 
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fields business research (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Williams and Aguilera, 
2008). This is where the present study seeks to contribute by utilizing aspects of 
Campbell’s framework of institutional conditions and empirically test them among a 
large pool of countries assessed in terms of CSR penetration. 
 
Institutional conditions vis-à-vis CSR: Outlining Campbell’s framework 
In his seminal paper, Campbell (2007) builds his argumentation around a central 
question: taking into account the overarching profit-maximization principle and 
opportunistic tendencies of business entities, what conditions facilitate the socially 
responsible conduct of companies or why would a firm operate in socially responsible 
ways? According to his viewpoint, firms that act in a socially responsible manner are 
either not knowingly do anything that could harm their stakeholders or, when they do 
cause such harm, rectify it whenever it is brought to their attention.  
Acknowledging that responsible corporate behavior varies across countries, 
Campbell draws on comparative political economy and institutional analysis literature 
to assert that that the way companies manage stakeholder demands and expectations is 
dependent on the institutions within which they operate. In this context, he formulates 
a set of propositions framing specific institutional conditions that affect firms’ 
propensity to act in socially responsible ways. 
First, Campbell denotes that companies with low profitability possess 
comparatively fewer slack resources to employ towards CSR practices. Even so, such 
is the case for firms experiencing financial losses and exhibit weak financial 
performance. In this context, focusing at the macro-level, he emphasizes the vital 
importance of the macroeconomic climate for CSR endorsement; macroeconomic 
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downturn and an unhealthy or unstable economic environment can have a direct effect 
on business profitability which in turn influences socially responsible behavior. 
Second, he conceptualizes a curvilinear relationship between CSR and competitive 
conditions. Specifically, in markets where competition is either very intense (i.e. 
cutthroat competition) or very low (i.e. monopolies or monopsonies) companies will 
disregard CSR engagement and, contrarily, will have the inclination to act in socially 
irresponsible ways. Yet, under normal conditions of market competition, he asserts 
that companies are very concerned to preserve their public image and reputation as 
well as to safeguard customer loyalty and suppliers’ trust. Thus, in such conditions 
firms are more likely to engage in CSR activities and endorse a socially responsible 
behavior. 
Next, Campbell sets forth the effectiveness of the regulatory framework denoting 
its criticality in facilitating CSR behavior. According to his conception, well-
designed, in terms of negotiation and consensus-building, as well as properly-
enforced laws and regulations can mitigate social irresponsibility and effectively 
monitor and control business conduct. In parallel with state regulation, he goes further 
to point out the need for industrial organizations to develop their own behavioral 
standards and self-regulation mechanisms to ensure increased CSR penetration.  
The fifth element in Campbell’s framework refers to the role of civic engagement 
in terms of stakeholder groups, NGOs and/or advocacy organizations that act as 
‘watchdogs’ and oversee corporate conduct in order to mobilize businesses to avert 
from alarming practices. By mobilizing media campaigns, drawing public attention, 
organizing demonstrations to exert pressure or appealing directly to firms such 
movements can minimize corporate irresponsibility and potentially contribute to 
incorporating CSR in corporate policies, plans and operations  
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Campbell goes on to indicate the role of education, trade/employee associations 
along with fruitful stakeholder dialogue in promoting the social responsibility of for-
profit organizations. He concludes his paper by stressing: a) that the institutional 
conditions which set the ‘rules of the game’ for business conduct are not static but 
dynamically shift over time, b) that deregulation alone, in the verge of a globalized 
economy, does not ensure high CSR penetration but robust institutions are also 
necessary and c) that managerial attitudes towards CSR are critical and should be 
accompanied with institutional mechanisms that ensure that firms are actually behave 
in a socially responsible manner.  
Campbell’s work paved the way for a more comprehensive investigation of 
comparative CSR trends and developments under the nexus of institutional structures 
and the efficiency of national institutional conditions. However, to date, there are no 
attempts to empirically test Campbell’s propositions. This is where our study seeks to 
contribute by investigating the relationship between CSR penetration and institutions 
that define the macroeconomic environment and the development dynamics of 
countries. The following section outlines the method and sample identification 
employed to achieve this goal. 
Material and methods 
Model specifications  
The proposed model specification is of the form: 
 
with y being a (nx1) vector and X an (nxk) matrix; β and ε are (kx1) and (nx1) vectors 
respectively.  
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Dependent variable: National CSR index 
Our dependent variable y is proxied by the national CSR index  (NCSRI) obtained 
from Skouloudis (2014) and Skouloudis et al. (2016) who extend Gjølberg’s (2009) 
assessment method and utilize country data on subscription, inclusion or participation 
in sixteen international CSR initiatives, environmental and social standards, ‘best-in-
class’ rankings and ethical investment stock exchange indices. Each one of these 
‘components’ for national CSR appraisal indicates the number of organizations 
endorsing the specific CSR ‘variable’. Skouloudis selects the year 2012 as the 
reference period for data capture and a ‘cut-off’ value of inclusion in at least four out 
of the sixteen CSR ‘sub-indices’ (i.e. national business sectors with presence in less 
than four components of the NCSRI were removed from the assessment). In this 
respect, 86 out of the 196 countries (Appendix 1), spanning from all geographical 
regions of the world are ranked in terms of CSR penetration, offering an 
encompassing worldview of the current CSR status.  
Independent variables 
X is the matrix including the explanatory variables of interest. Specifically, we 
consider five factors referring to distinct institutional conditions characterizing a 
national environment, in line with Campbell’s conceptual framework. 
Macroeconomic stability (MACRO) is expressed interchangeably in the model 
specifications presented below by a) the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) third pillar 
of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) referring to the macroeconomic 
environment (Model 1), and b) by a composite factor consisting of five 
macroeconomic figures: inflation rate (%), public debt to GDP (%), budget surplus or 
deficit (as % of GDP), current account balance (% of GDP) and the national 
unemployment rate (%) (Models 2 and 3).  
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Competitive conditions (COMP) are expressed by the WEF’s sixth pillar of the 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) referring to domestic and foreign competition 
and rated on a 1-7 scale. 
Regulatory effectiveness (REG) is expressed by the following five indices 
encapsulating the robustness and quality of the national regulatory framework: i) The 
Ease of Doing Business index, ii) the Corruption Perception index, iii) pillar 1A of 
WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index referring to public institutions along with iv) 
the Government Effectiveness and v) the Regulatory Quality indices of World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). 
Industrial self-regulation (INDUSTR) is proxied with the following WEFs GCI 
sub-indices pertaining to privately-established institutional arrangements: i) strength 
of auditing and reporting standards, ii) efficacy of corporate boards, iii) protection of 
minority shareholders’ interests and iv) strength of investor protection. 
Civic engagement (CIV) is expressed interchangeably in our model specifications 
presented below by a) the Civil Liberties sub-index of Freedom House’s 'Freedom in 
the World' index (Model 2), and b) the ‘Civic Activism’ index of the International 
Institute of Social Studies (ISS) (Model 3).  
To explore the extent to which country-level socioeconomic conditions moderate 
the relationship between institutions and CSR penetration, we controlled for human 
development, by employing the HDI index, and for income distribution through the 
GINI coefficient.  
In this context, the following function was estimated: 
NCSRI = f (MACRO, COMP, REG, INDUSTR, CIV, HDI, GINI) 
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Findings 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables considered while 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results – using three models with different 
variables – are reported in Table 2. In all three models there is no problem of 
normality.  
In Model 1 only the explanatory variables are included; namely the statistical 
significant variables are those of macroeconomic environment (expressed by WEF’s 
GCI pillar 3), competitive conditions, public institutions, the corruption perception 
index and government effectiveness. Facing increased heteroscedasticity we 
employed factor analysis and grouped variables in an attempt to cope with the issue. 
We devised three the factors, namely macroeconomic stability (consisting of the five 
aforementioned macroeconomic figures), regulatory effectiveness (derived from the 
five indices mentioned earlier which encapsulate the robustness and quality of the 
national regulatory framework) and industrial self- regulation (by utilizing WEFs GCI 
sub-indices pertaining to privately-established institutional arrangements).  
In this way, Model 2 includes these three factors along with civic engagement 
expressed by the Freedom House’s civil liberties proxy. Model 2, although better 
compared to Model 1, still faced problems of heteroscedasticity.  
In Model 3 we first included all three factors and civic engagement expressed by 
the ISS’s civic activism proxy and then we run the same specification with the 
addition of the control variables (HDI and GINI). The control variable HDI was found 
to be statistically insignificant with a value of P=0.143. Likewise, GINI presented P-
values even higher and equal to 0.7 and it was omitted. Model 3 is better compared to 
Models 2 and 3 with no issues of heteroscedasticity.  
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The parameter estimates in the proposed regressions reveal that all model 
formulations have as explanatory variables the proxies pertaining to the 
macroeconomic conditions in the level of 5% in Model 1 (macroeconomic 
environment) and in the 10% significance level in Models 2 and 3 (macroeconomic 
stability factor). Regulatory effectiveness is statistically significant in all statistical 
levels; the variable industrial self-regulation is significant in all levels in Model 2 and 
in the level of 5% in Model 3. Still the proxies of these institutional conditions are 
correlated with the dependent variable with very low magnitudes. Civic engagement, 
expressed by civil liberties in Model 2 and civic activism in the other two 
specifications of Model 3, are statistically significant in all levels of significance. 
Civil liberties and HDI are negatively correlated with NCSRI. The variable of civic 
activism presents very high magnitudes and a positive relationship with the dependent 
variable. Comparing the last two model specifications it can be seen that the third 
model by using civic activism performs quite well with no indication of 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables considered 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Obs 
NCSRI -18.32320 -24.21512 14.43203 -37.06495 20.64357 86 
MACRO -0.046512 -5380.500 99999.95 -326424.0 498723.0 86 
REG -0.023256 -34013.50 100000.0 -50511.00 723436.0 86 
INDUSTR 0.012195 5912.000 99999.98 -267023.0 167964.0 82 
COMP 4.5696 4.567 0.5936 2.6270 5.8901 84 
CIVACT 0.538682 0.524000 0.053540 0.423000 0.679000 85 
CIVLIB 2.732558 2.000000 1.745073 1.000000 7.000000 86 
GINI 37.59500 36.50000 9.351476 23.00000 63.10000 80 
HDI 0.786129 0.806000 0.103517 0.500000 0.943000 85 
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Table 2:  OLS model results and diagnostics tests (P-Values in brackets). 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  
-10.7278 
[0.0000] 
-119.17 
[0.0000] 
-110.53 
[0.0000] 
Macroeconomic environment 
-2.8608 
[0.0195] 
   
Macroeconomic stability  
0.000014 
[0.0983] 
0.00001 
[0.0945] 
0.0000097 
[0.0979] 
Competitive conditions 
-11.4954 
[0.0000] 
   
Regulatory effectiveness  
0.00008 
[0.0000] 
0.000034 
[0.0000] 
0.000047 
[0.0032] 
Industrial self-regulation  
0.000034 
[0.0019] 
0.000021 
[0.0161] 
0.0000203 
[0.0168] 
Civil liberties  
-2.7138 
[0.0000] 
 
 
Civic 
engagement 
Civic activism  
 187.63 
[0.0000] 
204.583 
[0.0000] 
Corruption Perception Index 
-0.1381 
[0.0131] 
   
Public Institutions 
5.5402 
[0.0271] 
   
Government Effectiveness 
0.49524 
[0.0000] 
   
HDI  
 
 
 
-22.383 
[0.1429] 
R
 
square 0.58 0.62 0.76 0.772 
Normality test (Jarque-Bera) 
0.16796 
[0.9194] 
0.6513 
[0.7221] 
1.3645 
[0.5055] 
2.6459 
[0.2664] 
Heteroscedasticity test  
(Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey) 
4,2473 
[0.0018] 
5.2363 
[0.0009] 
1.5296 
[0.2021] 
1.3232 
[0.2637] 
Heteroscedasticity test (Harvey) 
2.2622 
0.0563] 
1.3549 
[0.2575] 
1.4982 
[0.2112] 
7.6859 
[0.1744] 
Heteroscedasticity test (Glejser) 
4.1774 
[0.0020] 
4.7029 
[0.0019] 
2.4111 
[0.1112] 
1.8499 
[0.1184] 
ARCH effect test 
2.4549 
[0.1212] 
8.3428 
[0.0051] 
0.08318 
[0.7739] 
0.000453 
[0.9831] 
Heteroscedasticity test (White) 
2.3794 
[0.0080] 
3.0485 
[0.0011] 
1.45502 
[0.1121] 
1.42296 
[0.2260] 
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A first observation on the findings is that in general they indicate partial support to 
Campbell’s conceptual framework as it was operationalized in our assessment. Civic 
engagement appears to be the most important condition affecting CSR penetration. 
This should not come as a surprise since in a large body of the ‘business in society’ 
literature CSR is, by definition, a discretionary activity stimulated and spurred by the 
various expectations and demands of organizational stakeholder groups (e.g. Mitchell 
et al., 1997; Lozano, 2005; 2011). We expected a stronger influence on the role of 
macroeconomic environment and regulatory effectiveness on national CSR 
penetration but according to our model specifications they do not seem to play a 
critical role. Likewise, the insignificant impact of competitive conditions on national 
CSR requires further attention and in-depth empirical investigation. 
Concluding remarks 
Our findings offer some fruitful avenues for future research. One possible 
explanation of the statistical results may be that our sample contains data only for one 
year; a study that captures relevant data over a time series and employs panel data 
analysis could challenge or bolster our results. Further research could not only amend 
the aforementioned limitations but also include and test additional institutional 
conditions set forth in Campbell’s framework by devising appropriate variables. 
Additionally, the variables employed in order to assess the institutional conditions 
may not perfectly reflect Campbell’s conception and researchers may use different 
proxies with probably better fit.  
Still, our study demonstrates that empirical research on the institutional parameters 
influencing CSR is a field that needs further investigation with the use of both refined 
statistical techniques as well as in-depth qualitative approaches that focus on country 
groups (e.g. high-low income countries) in order to explain regional discrepancies in 
14 
 
CSR penetration. Likewise, assessing through large cross country samples the 
moderating effects of informal institutions (e.g. cultural traits and religious beliefs) on 
CSR, could draw a better understanding of the tensions between the nexus of national 
institutions and socially responsible business behavior. 
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 Country NCSRI  Country NCSRI  Country NCSRI 
1 Switzerland 20,64 30 Greece   -15,36 59 Mexico -27,36 
2 Sweden   19,50 31 Thailand   -17,79 60 Kazakhstan   -27,53 
3 Finland   18,99 32 Romania   -17,98 61 Turkey   -27,78 
4 Denmark   12,59 33 Malaysia   -18,99 62 Costa Rica   -27,84 
5 United Kingdom  9,64 34 Hungary   -19,50 63 Ecuador   -28,06 
6 Netherlands   9,27 35 Bulgaria   -19,68 64 Pakistan   -28,10 
7 Norway   8,04 36 India   -20,64 65 Argentina   -28,37 
8 Australia 6,17 37 Lithuania   -20,87 66 Bolivia   -28,37 
9 Spain   4,21 38 Slovakia   -21,73 67 Philippines   -29,56 
10 France   2,58 39 Taiwan -22,02 68 Qatar   -29,65 
11 Portugal   2,30 40 Croatia   -23,07 69 Belarus   -30,18 
12 Singapore   0,77 41 Panama   -23,41 70 Tunisia   -30,26 
13 Japan   -0,25 42 Slovenia   -23,83 71 Honduras   -30,43 
14 Canada -0,76 43 United Arab Emirates  -24,17 72 Kuwait   -30,65 
15 Belgium   -1,22 44 Serbia -24,26 73 Kenya   -30,79 
16 Italy   -1,56 45 Sri Lanka   -24,39 74 Egypt   -31,45 
17 Germany   -3,93 46 Latvia   -24,81 75 Ukraine   -31,66 
18 Hong Kong -5,40 47 Indonesia   -25,03 76 Georgia   -32,26 
19 Ireland   -5,70 48 Estonia   -25,12 77 Russian Federation -32,38 
20 USA -11,02 49 Jordan   -25,19 78 Oman   -32,50 
21 Luxembourg   -11,12 50 Bahrain   -25,41 79 Nigeria   -33,13 
22 Brazil   -11,74 51 Viet Nam -25,55 80 Guatemala   -33,51 
23 Colombia   -11,99 52 Mauritius   -26,04 81 Syrian Arab Republic -33,70 
24 South Korea -12,13 53 Czech Republic   -26,25 82 Morocco   -33,94 
25 Austria   -12,21 54 Iceland   -26,36 83 Iran  -34,00 
26 South Africa   -12,58 55 Poland   -26,36 84 Bangladesh   -34,93 
27 Israel   -13,57 56 China   -26,65 85 Venezuela   -35,44 
28 Chile   -15,13 57 Peru   -26,66 86 Saudi Arabia   -37,06 
29 New Zealand -15,19  58 Uruguay   -26,98   
Appendix 1: Country scores according to Skouloudis (2014) and Skouloudis et al. (2016) national CSR index 
